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PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF ABSTRACTERS
THOMAS G. ROADY, JR.*

One of the most vigorous rules in the law of conveyancing is that a
vendee of real estate assumes the risk of all defects in title discovered
after delivery of the deed. In short, the doctrine of caveat emptor applies with full force to the purchaser and to protect himself as fully as
possible he must insist that the transaction proceed in such a manner
as to give him recourse against someone should he sustain a loss by
reason of the title risk taken or he must proceed in a manner that will
eliminate (or at least minimize) the risks taken.
In attempting to protect himself a vendee can pursue one or more
of the following methods or devices. He can refuse to accept a deed
without full covenants of warranty in which case he may be able to
recover from his grantor for any loss sustained due to his grantor's
defective title. He can obtain a title insurance policy with a reliable
company and thereby have available an independent source from
which to recover for any loss he might sustain by reason of title defects. He can obtain at his own expense or can require the vendor to
furnish him with an abstract of title which abstract is submitted to
his attorney for examination prior to the completion of the sale. In
some jurisdictions he can also insist on the registration of the title
under the "Torrens system" which system is designed to clear the
title of whatever defects may be involved before completion of the
sale. The first two methods are designed to reimburse a vendee for
loss sustained while the last two are designed to eliminate risks in
advance. In the ordinary real estate transaction a combination of
two and sometimes three of these methods is used. The most frequent
combination is probably the warranty deed plus attorney-abstracter
method which on occasions is supplemented with title insurance. In
certain sections of the country the warranty deed coupled with title
insurance is the prevailing practice.
Unfortunately, none of the above alone or in combination have been
entirely satisfactory. Purchasers proceeding in the most cautious manner may still find themselves inadequately protected from risk of loss
due to title defects. The scope of this paper is the liability of an abstracter who, as a participant in the marketing of real estate, fails to
conduct an accurate search or for any reason fails to prepare a correct
abstract of the record. Elsewhere in this symposium is a discussion
of the liability of an attorney who renders an erroneous title opinion
or who issues a certificate of title that results in loss to the one rely* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Faculty Advisor, Vanderbilt
Law Review; Member, Tennessee and Illinois Bars.
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ing thereon.' We are here concerned solely with the professional
abstracter, whether he be an attorney or not.
The abstracter's liability for negligence arises out of the abstracteremployer relationship. This relationship is regarded as being created
by a contract of employment. As a consequence, the bulk of the litigation against abstracters has proceeded on the theory of breach of contract. In those instances where the action is treated as sounding in
tort the courts have made very little of the fact that the duty to exercise due care arises out of a contract. In both the contract and tort
cases the important element to be established is non-compliance with
the standard of care that is required of the abstracter and the language
used by the courts in formulating that standard is replete with negligence terminology. In short, one engaged in the business of abstracting titles impliedly represents that he or his employees have a certain
degree of skill and knowledge and that they will perform their undertaking with a degree of care commensurate with that of other abstracters. Since the issues arising in these actions are essentially the
same whether based on tort or contract theory the form of the action
ordinarily does not affect the outcome. In view of this fact, the discussion which follows is organized on the basis of an action against
an abstracter being in tort for negligence.
DUTY
The relationship between abstracter and client carries with it a
duty on the part of the abstracter to use a certain degree of care and
skill in carrying out his undertaking. It is not essential that the abstracters in fact receive any consideration for his services.2 It is
enough that plaintiff show an agreement to perform such services.
From this the duty will be imposed.
The principal difficulty most plaintiffs have met in their effort to
recover from abstracters is the almost universal rule that the basis of
any liability is contractual. 3 In view of the fact that the abstracter is
generally insulated by one or more persons from the one who eventually sustains a loss in reliance on his work, the contract approach permits him to escape liability since the requisite "privity" cannot be
established. 4 It is immaterial that conveyancing custom and practice
1. Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 755
(1959).

2. Decatur Land Loan & Abstract Co. v. Rutland, 185 S.W. 1064 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1916).
3. National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879); Talpey v. Wright, 61
Ark. 275, 32 S.W. 1072 (1895); Mallory v. Ferguson, 50 Kan. 685, 32 Pac. 410
(1893); Beckovsky v. Burton Abstract & Title Co., 208 Mich. 224, 175 N.W. 235
(1919); Henkels v. Philadelphia Title & Ins. Co., 177 Pa. Super 110, 110 A.2d
878 (1955); Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Bank, 118 Tenn. 678, 102 S.W.
901 (1907). Annots., 34 A.L.R. 67 (1925); 68 A.L.R. 375 (1930).
4. Where the abstract is furnished at the instance of the vendor and the
vendee sustains the loss, liability may be imposed on the abstracter in a
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is such that an abstracter knows his work will be relied on by others
or that under a "foreseeability" test he would be held accountable.
All too often he has been the beneficiary of the privity requirement for
it is good contract law that "no privity-no duty."
Once this hurdle is cleared, the courts have often dealt quite aggressively with abstracters for the relationship of an abstracter to his
employer is a confidential one, at least during the period of his employment. He is, therefore, accountable to his employer for any advantage gained as a result of information or knowledge he acquires in
carrying out his duties.5
The contract approach has also stimulated the abstracting profession,
which is composed of a number of careful, cautious and often "clever"
individuals (many of them being attorneys) to utilize the certification process in abstracting as a means of limiting the scope of their
liability. 6 It is regarded as good abstracting practice to exclude via the
certificate a multitude of items which to an ordinary layman might
seem quite obscure.7 And where the abstracting company is in the
business of conveyancing "across the board" so to speak, situations
arise which would be amusing if they did not import such tragic consequences for the lay public. 8
roundabout method. If there is involved a breach of vendor's warranties the
vendee may sue the vendor who in turn may sue the abstracter assuming of
course that he can establish, among other things, that he warranted in reliance on the record disclosed by the abstract. See Randall v. Paine-Nichols
Abstract Co., 205 Okla. 430, 238 P.2d 319 (1951).
5. Vallette v. Tedens, 122 Ill. 607, 14 N.E. 52 (1887) (abstracter held as trustee for employer with respect to real estate purchased after obtaining facts in
course of employment); Marston v. Catterlin, 239 Mo. 390, 144 S.W. 475 (1912)
(abstracter could not assert title as purchaser against his employer as to real
estate bought at foreclosure proceeding under deed of trust he had failed

to show in abstract).

6. It is fundamental, for example, that the obligation extends only to the
period of time indicated in the certificate and in continuations or amendments
this may be a rather brief period.
7. For example, it is reasonable to indicate that the abstract does not
cover judgments of record of courts whose records are geographically a considerable distance from the abstracter's place of business; to exclude rights
or claims of persons in possession of the premises; to exclude expressly
any statements as to area of premises other than that which a competent
"survey would establish"; to exclude easements, licenses and profits not of
record. It is not so reasonable to exclude ordinances and regulations of gov-

ernmental authorities affecting use of the premises although this is often

done. It is quite unreasonable to attempt via the certificate to escape any or
all liability through some general disclaimer clause as was done by the company in Guaranty Abstract Co. v. Denman, 209 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948), where the following words were used: "This certificate is made and
evidenced by the acceptance thereof that the undersigned, while believing its
construction of the records as above set out to be true and correct, still will
incur no liability by reason of such construction." Id. at 215. The court in that
case made short work of the abstracter's assertion that such a clause relieved it of liability for failure to include an outstanding deed in the chain
of title.
8. In Henkels v. Philadelphia Title Ins. Co., 177 Pa. Super 110, 110 A.2d 878
(1955), the title company agreed to conduct a search and to discover and
make known to plaintiff any and all taxes, liens, encumbrances or defects in
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As a consequence of the privity requirement and the apparent injustices which result therefrom some courts have sustained plaintiffs'
claims either by straining the concept of privity, by applying some
variation of the "foreseeability" test or by relying on the statutes that
exist in many of the western states.
An abstracter is not a guarantor or insurer of the title in the absence
of some express undertaking and though this is the common law viewD
it is expressly so provided by statute in at least one state. 10
BREACH OF

DuTY

The duty of the abstracter has been variously phrased in terms of
the care, skill and knowledge he must employ in his undertaking. The
basic decision discussing this point is Savings Bank v. Ward" wherein
the court stated that those who agree to furnish information concerning the title to real estate impliedly contract to exercise reasonable
care and skill in the performance of the undertaking, and if they are
negligent or fail to exercise reasonable care and skill in the discharge
of the stipulated services, they are responsible to their employers for
the loss occasioned by such neglect or want of care.1 2 This language
has been often repeated. 3 A more precise statement of the standard
of care, and one which is in fact more appropriate is that "which an
ordinary, reasonable and prudent abstracter exercises or is acustomed
to exercise under the same or similar circumstances. 14
In applying the standard to given fact situations it has been held,
or suggested, that an abstracter was negligent who relied on a maror against said title. They reported that there were no taxes outstanding
although in fact a small strip of the premises had been encumbered by taxes
for a long period of time. This was called to plaintiff's attention after the
purchase and plaintiff paid the taxes. The title company, in addition to making search, preparing instruments of conveyance, and performing other tasks
for all of which plaintiff received an itemized statement, had also issued a
policy of title insurance, the coverage of which expressly excepted from the
policy the part of the premises encumbered by the tax lien. The company
contended that this settlement certificate containing the exceptions constituted notice to plaintiffs that defendant was making no representations
concerning the taxes on the strip. The defense was held to be inadequate.
9. Shine v. Nash Abstract & Invest. Co., 217 Ala. 498, 117 So. 47, 4 ALA. L.J.
40 (1928).
10. ARiz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1563 (1956).
11. 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
12. Id. at 205. It is to be noted that this is the general language of negligence and indicates that the tort measure of damages is applicable, i.e., "all
loss occasioned by the neglect" not just the loss contemplated by the parties
for breach, as in contract.
13. See cases collected in Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 891 (1953) and Hall, Abstracter's Liability in Examination of Title, 6 Wyo. L.J. 184 (1952).
14. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770, 775 (W.D. Ark. 1953). By statute in
some jurisdictions a degree of care higher than that of an ordinarily prudent
abstracter is required. But in Mallory v. Ferguson, 50 Kan. 685, 32 Pac. 410
(1893), the defendant was a clerk in an official's office and in determining
the standard of care applied to him the court stated that it was only such as
the "defendant in fact possessed."
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ginal entry on a mortgage rather than examining the actual mortgage
instrument,15 failed to show an acceleration clause in a mortgage 16
omitted a deed in chain of title,17 omitted a tax lien on premises,18
failed to show the nature of the estate devised by clause in a will
included in the abstract, 19 failed to show judgment against a grantee
in chain of title,20 or omitted an entry in judgment docket even though
decree of foreclosure at judicial sale and decree of confirmation were
shown. 21 No breach of duty was involved where abstracter did not
include a deed made by a common grantor not in direct chain of title
to premises described in caption of abstract,22 failed to show judgment
entered against grantee in chain of title where middle initial of name
was different,23 or failed to include all of the records in a judicial
24
proceeding affecting title to the real estate.
Such exceptions as exist to the almost universal rule that a plaintiff
must establish privity of contract in order to recover from an abstracter are based upon statutes, or upon some strained concept of
privity employing third party beneficiary language or some strained
treatment of a fact situation to support a finding that an abstract
was issued to an agent or was reissued or recertified to a purchaser.
Liability Based on Statutes
In a number of states legislatures cognizant of the special problem
posed by the common law rule limiting liability of an abstracter to
those with whom he is in privity of contract and desiring to expand
the scope of an abstracter's liability have enacted statutes providing
a basis for recovery to all those injured by the fraud or mistake of
abstracters.2 An important provision of these statutes is the one re15. Wacek v. Frink, 51 Minn. 282, 53 N.W. 633 (1892); 'Morin v. Divide

County Abstract Co., 48 N.D. 214, 183 N.W. 1006 (1921) (abstracter relied
upon his own books rather than searching official record).
16. National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879); Adams v. Greer,
114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Dickle v. Nashville Abstract Co., 89 Tenn.
431, 14 S.W. 896 (1890).

17. Guaranty Abstract Co. v. Denman, 209 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
18. Henkels v. Philadelphia Title Ins. Co., 177 Pa. Super 110, 110 A.2d 878
(1955).
19. Equitable Building & Loan Ass'n v. Bank, 118 Tenn. 678, 102 S.W. 901
(1907).
20. Stephenson v. Cone, 24 S.D. 460, 124 N.W. 439 (1910).
21. Boone v. Sparrow, 235 N.C. 396, 70 S.E.2d 204 (1952).
22. Lizzio v. Craft, 135 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1954), Appeal dismissed, 284 App. Div.
862, 135 N.Y.S.2d 777 (4th Dep't 1954).
23. Turk v. Benson, 30 N.D. 200, 152 N.W. 354 (1915).
24. Kenthan v. St. Louis Trust Co., 101 Mo. App. 1, 73 S.W. 334 (1903).
25. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-4 (1953) (no license issued until bond filed

and approved). Section 1-1-5 covers any and all actual damages sustained by

or accruing to any person having cause of action due to error or deficiency in
abstract or continuation thereof. Minimum bond $5,000-maximum $15,000.
Other similar statutes may be found in IDn o CODE ANN. § 54-101 (1947);
KAN. GEN.STAT. ANN. § 67-802 (1949); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 66-2113 (1947);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-501 (1943); NEv. REV. STAT. § 240-270 (1957); N.D. REV.
CODE § 43-0109 (1943); OY-TA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 § 1 (1952); S.D. CODE § 1.0107
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quiring, the posting of a surety bond by those who would engage in
such business designed to provide a source from which injured persons
can be indemnified. While in view of today's inflated real estate values
the amount of the bond required is unrealistic, it is not greatly significant since the opening of the door by the legislature for suits in tort
against abstracters has the practical effect of causing most of them to
insure the risk they now assume in those jurisdictions.
As a consequence of such statutes the bulk of litigation against abstracters in recent years has arisen in these jurisdictions. Some of
the-decisions indicate the tremendous extension over common law liability that the statutes provide in such matters as the degree of care
27
required of an abstracter, 26 the parties within the statutes' coverage,
and the assurance of some financial responsibility.28 Save for the
Hillock case, 29 however, a cause of action is held to arise under such
statutes when the abstract is delivered and not when the defect or
omission is discovered.3°
Third PartyBeneficiary
Can the vendee be given the status of a third party beneficiary of
an agreement between the vendor and abstracter for the purchase of
an abstract? In those few instances where this theory of liability has
been discussed much has been made of the fact that the abstracter
knew the abstract was intended for the third person's information and
use.3 1 In fact, in the jurisdiction giving most support to this theory it
was subsequently pointed out that an abstracter could not be held lia(1939); UTAH CODE ANN. § 1-1-12 (1953); Wyo. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 66-601
(1945).
In Alabama it is a misdemeanor to fraudulently certify an abstract. ALA.
CODE ANN. tit. 14 § 10 (1940). Arkansas and Minnesota statutes are designed
apparently to protect the public records. ARx. STAT. ANN. § 71-103 (Supp.
1957); MNM. STAT. ANN. § 386.18 (1958). The Arkansas statute § 71-115 provides for permissive bonding to cover actual damages that may be sustained
or accrue to any person by reason of error or deficiency in abstract.
26. Leeper v. Patton, 91 Okla. 12, 215 Pac. 421 (1923) ("high degree of
care"); Gate City Abstract Co. v. Post, 55 Neb. 742, 76 N.W. 471 (1898)
("vouches for correctness of abstract").
27. Goldberg v. Sisseton Loan Title Co., 24 S.D. 49, 123 N.W. 266 (1909).
See cases collected at Annot., 34 A.L.R. 67 (1925).
28. Bondsman and abstracter are jointly and severally liable. See Merrill
v. Fremont Abstract Co., 39 Idaho 238, 227 Pac. 34 (1924).
29. Hillock v. Idaho Title & Trust Co., 22 Idaho 440, 126 Pac. 612 (1912).
30. E. T. Arnold & Co. v. Barner, 91 Kan. 768, 139 Pac. 404 (1914); Mott v.
Adams County Abstract Co., 73 N.D. 645, 18 N.W.2d 15 (1945); Freemon v.
Wilson, 105 Okla. 87, 231 Pac. 869 (1924). The Hillock case proceeded on the
theory of fraud. The action was held to arise when the fraud was discovered.
In the Mott case, the same view was expressed.
31. Dickle v. Nashville Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S.W. 896 (1890),
Denton v. Nashville Title Co., 112 Tenn. 320, 79 S.W. 799 (1904); Economy
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. West Jersey Title & Guaranty Co., 64 N.J. 427, 44 Atl.
854 (1899); Brown v. Sims, 22 Ind. App. 317, 53 N.E. 779 (1899). Contra,
Zweigardt v. Birdseye, 57 Mo. App. 462 (1894).
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ble save where privity of contract existed and this privity could only
be satisfied in exceptional cases by showing that the abstracter knew
of the specific use intended.32 And in Thomas v. Guarantee Title &
Trust Co.33 this line of cases was criticized as examples of courts
straining the privity doctrine to mitigate the rigorous nature of the
rule.
It is essential that one claiming as a third party beneficiary show
that the promisor (abstracter) or the promisee (vendor) intended
to confer a benefit upon him.3 4 This intent will not, however, be inferred from a custom or practice by vendors in supplying vendees
with abstracts no matter how well established it might be.
Grantoras Agent of Vendee
In Young v. Lohr35 it was held that an abstracter was liable to the
owner of the premises though the contract was by the owner's agent,
who did not disclose his principal.36 Certainly there would be no
strain on the privity requirement but for the fact that the principal
was undisclosed. This case stands alone but offers a suggestive alternative to a court trying to find some basis for holding an abstracter
liable to a vendee when the abstract was prepared at the request of
the vendor and the jurisdiction is committed to the privity require37
ment.
Reissuance or Recertification to Third Party
From the vendee's point of view a practical solution [to the privity
requirement] is to insist that the abstract be certified to him38 and
that where an extension or amendment only is involved to insist that
there be a reissuance or recertification of the entire abstract. If this
32. Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Bank of Commerce & Title Co., Ilg

Tenn. 678, 102 S.W. 901 (1907). See also Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Continental!Oil Co., 43 Ariz. 219, 29 P.2d 1065, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 876 (1934) (court
erroneously indicated that knowledge as to the actual beneficiary's identity
was essential); Sickler v. Indian River Abstract & Guaranty Co., 142 Fla. 528,
195 So. 195 (1940).
33. 81 Ohio St. 432, 91 N.E. 183 (1910).
34. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 356A, 380 (1936).
35. 118 Iowa 624, 92 N.W. 684 (1902).
36. For discussion criticizing this approach see 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §
352 (1936).
37. When an abstracter has an arrangement with a bank or building and
loan association whereby abstracts are furnished at the cost of borrowers for
the use of the lending institution and abstracts are delivered knowing that
they are for such use and that the lending institution will rely on their
accuracy, it would seem that there is sufficient privity to sustain a recovery
for negligence of the abstracter. It has been so held. Western Loan & Savings
Co. v. Silver Bow Abstract Co., 31 Mont. 448, 78 Pac. 774 (1904). While it is
possible for an abstracter to incur tort liability on facts similar to Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) it would seem to require
him to certify that he had searched the records when he had in fact not
done so. There are no abstracter cases which have proceeded on this theoryj
38. Beckovsky v. Burton Title & Abstract Co., 208 Mich. 224, 175 N.W. 235,
(1919).
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is done there is no question but that he is entitled to whatever protection the law affords one in privity with the abstracter. But the
expense involved will ordinarily discourage this procedure and in
many sections of the country it would be quite an extreme departure
from the established routine.
CASUAL RELATION

In order for plaintiff to recover in his action against an abstracter it
is necessary for him to show that the latter's negligence was the legal
cause of damage to him. There is, of course, no real problem in the
obvious case where a purchaser informs the abstracter that he will not
buy until such abstract is completed and it is delivered to him with
the omission of a deed which renders the vendor's title defective as
a result of which the purchaser loses the land 39 or where omission by
is required to
the abstracter is of a valid lien which the purchaser
40
discharge to protect his interest in the premises.
But the requirement that a plaintiff established a casual relationship
between his damage and defendant's breach of duty4 ' has at times
given plaintiffs considerable difficulty. In Roberts v. Leon Loan & Abstract Co.,4 even though defendant had erroneously indicated the date
of an execution sale in the abstract and even though plaintiff may
have relied on the date therein set forth, a directed verdict for defendant was sustained because. there was no evidence tending to show that
plaintiff would have or could have redeemed from such sale had she
known the true date; therefore, the error was not the proximate cause
43
of the loss.

DAMAGES

The measure of damages used in an action to recover from an abstracter is ordinarily stated in terms of those which are directly or
proximately caused by the breach of duty to furnish a true and correct abstract. While this rule does not seem to pose any great limitation on the amount to be recovered other than that the plaintiff
establish a casual connection between the injury and the breach the
cases reveal that the amount allowed rarely, if ever, exceeds that
which may reasonably be supposed to have been within the con39. Morin v. Divide County Abstract Co., 48 N.D. 214, 183 N.W. 1006 (1921).
40. Henkels v. Philadelphia Title Ins. Co., 177 Pa. Super 110, 110 A.2d 878
(1955).
41. Guaranty Abstract Co. v. Denman, 209 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948).
42. 69 Iowa 673, 29 N.W. 776 (1886). See also Randall v. Paine-Nichols
Abstract Co., 205 Okla. 430, 238 P.2d 319 (1951) where although abstract was
admittedly erroneous plaintiff did not rely on abstracter's error when he
executed warranty deed resulting in his liability to grantee.
43. See also Gronseth v. Mohn, 57 S.D. 604, 234 N.W. 603, 3 DAH. L. REV. 320
(1931); Williams v. Hanly, 16 Ind. App. 464, 45 N.E. 622 (1896).
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templation of the parties at the time of the contract as the probable
result of the breach 44
Certainly, it is everywhere recognized that before a plaintiff can recover he must establish that he relied on the abstract as negligently
prepared 45 and that he suffered actual loss as a resul.6 If, for example, a purchaser buys without waiting for an abstract he has
ordered, he would not be heard to complain that the abstract as later
delivered was defective 47 and further, even though an abstract may be
defective in not revealing the true state of the record, it is obvious
48
that there may be no actual loss and no recovery.
Damages have been awarded in a number of cases measured by the
amount of an existing tax lien negligently omitted from the abstract
and paid by the plaintiff,49 the differen6e between the amount paid
for land and its value as encumbered by a mining lease erroneously
omitted from the abstract 50 and where as a result of the negligence
plaintiff has lost the land he has been awarded the money paid for the
premises plus his expenses in defending his title with interest.5 1
The generally accepted principle of contract law that a party injured
by breach of a contract must act to avoid or minimize damages and
cannot recover for losses which could have been avoided through
the exercise of reasonable diligence on his part is applicable to the
abstracter liability cases.52 One of the most recent statements of this
rule is contained in Guaranty Abstract Co. v. Denman53 although on
the facts it was found that plaintiff had not breached this obligation.
In that case the vendor, who was liable on breach of his warranties,
offered to pay the vendee (plaintiff) part of the loss occurred because
44. See cases collected at Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 891 (1953).
45. Maggio v. Abstract Title & Mortg. Corp., 98 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (App. Div.
4th Dep't 1950).
46. Walker v. Bowman, 27 Okla. 172, 111 Pac. 319 (1910).
47. Beckovksy v. Burton Abstract & Title Co., 208 Mich. 224, 175 N.W. 235
(1919).
48. An extreme example would be the showing of a tax lien that had in
fact been discharged. A more logical illustration would be failure to show
an encumbrance of record long since barred by the statute of limitations. Nor
could he recover for the satisfaction of an invalid claim or encumbrance. See
Manville v. Le Flore-McCasland Abstract & Realty Co., 65 Okla. 12, 162 Pac.
682 (1917).
49. Henkels v. Philadelphia Title Ins. Co., 177 Pa. Super 110, 110 A.2d 878
(1955); Walker v. Bowman, 27 Okla. 172, 111 Pac. 319 (1910).
50. See DeVilliers v. Pioneer Abstract & Loan Co., 92 Okla. 80, 218 Pac. 310
(1923). This result even though plaintiff had expanded a considerable sum
attempting to remove lease as a cloud on title and had eventually paid a
substantial sum for the leasehold interest.
51. Morin v. Divide County Abstract Co., 48 N.D. 214, 183 N.W. 1006 (1921).

See also Washington County Abstract Co. v. Harris, 48 Okla. 577, 149 Pac.
1075 (1915).
52. Roberts v. Leon Loan & Abstract Co., 63 Iowa 76 (1884); Washington
County Abstract Co. v. Harris, 48 Okla. 577, 149 Pac. 1075 (1915); Sackett v.
Rose, 55 Okla. 398, 154 Pac. 1177 (1916).
53. 209 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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of a defect in title, which defect had been negligently omitted from
the abstract by the defendant company. The vendor promised to pay
the balance over a period of time. The court held that refusal of
plaintiff to accept the money was not a breach of his duty to minimize
damages since it might have crippled his right of action against the
54
abstract company who was financially able to respond in damages.
The failure to minimize damages is treated as an affirmative defense 5 and applies to the abstracter as well as to his employer. 56
DEFENSES

Statute of Limitations
The defense asserted most frequently by abstracters is that the
statute of limitations has run on plaintiff's cause of action. In this
connection the customary problems arise. What statute is applicable?
When does the cause of action accrue?
As to the applicable statute, there is quite general agreement that
the one governing contract actions applies.57 This, of course, where
there is no statute of limitations specifically applicable to abstracters.
But even though the action is in contract disputes have arisen over
the period governing the action since many jurisdictions have multiple
statutes applying to contracts or agreements. 8
In the case of Adams v. Greer59 the defendant abstracter had failed
to show an acceleration clause in a mortgage. Plaintiff and defendant had entered into an oral agreement obligating defendant to bring
down to date an existing abstract. Defendant completed the amendment and certified it as of August 24, 1949 delivering the completed
abstract some time between August 24th and 31st. Plaintiff's action
was filed on July 28, 1953. Defendant asserted that the three year
statute of limitations applicable to contracts, obligations or liabilities
not under seal and not in writing applied whereas plaintiff contended
that the five year statute applicable to instruments in writing applied.
Plaintiff's argument proceeded on the theory that the abstracter's certificate (in writing) was the basis of the contractual obligation but the
court held that the contract arose out of the acceptance of employ54. See also Murphy v. Fidelity Abstract & Title Co., 114 Wash. 77, 194 Pac.
591 (1921).
55. Hershiser v. Ward, 29 Nev. 228 (1906).
56. Hillock v. Idaho Title & Trust Co., 22 Idaho 440, 126 Pac. 612 (1912).
57. Adams v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Talpey v. Wright,
61 Ark. 275, 32 S.W. 1072 (1895); Lattin v. Gillette, 95 Cal. 317, 30 Pac. 545
(1892); Russell & Co. v. Polk County Abstract Co., 87 Iowa 233, 54 N.W. 212
(1893); Provident Loan & Trust Co. v. Walcott, 5 Kan. App. 473, 47 Pac. 8
(1895); Schade v. Gehner, 133 Mo. 252, 34 S.W. 576 (1896); Close v. Coates,
187 Okla. 315, 102 P.2d 613 (1940); Equitable Building & Loan Ass'n v. Bank
of Commerce, 118 Tenn. 678, 102 S.W. 901 (1907).
58. A A. CODE AwN. tit. 7, § 21 (1940) (contract not under seal, 6 years),
§ 20 (contract under seal, 10 years).
59. 114 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
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ment by defendant and antedated the making of the certificate. The
agreement being an oral one, the three year statute controlled the
60
action.
Since there ordinarily is little difference in time allowed for bringing actions6 ' the most important factor in applying a statute of limitation is the determination of when the cause of action accrues. On
this point there is quite general agreement that it is at the time the abstract is delivered. 62 But in Hillock v. Idaho Title & Trust Co.,63 the
court said that the cause of action did not accrue upon mere delivery
of the abstract and certificate but rather when plaintiffs "were called
upon to pay some valid claim held against the property and not shown
by the abstract or had notice of the claim and the falsity of the representation. 6 4 The court apparently regarded the action as in tort for
fraudulent misrepresentations and as not arising until a discovery of
the fraud.
Others
There are a few cases where it seems that courts have applied the
doctrine of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk to
claims against abstracters although they can probably best be explained in terms of nonreliance by plaintiff on defendant's breach.
In Lizzio v. Craft,65 the defendant had failed to include in the abstract
deeds containing restrictions not in the direct chain of title to the
captioned premises but executed by a common grantor. In holding
that the common grantor could not assert such restrictions the court
stated that the grantor could not "excuse her failure to bring the restrictions to the attention of her grantee or shift the burden of responsibility to the shoulders of the abstract company."66 In any event,
if the defendant relies on contributory negligence, assumption of risk,
or notice, he must assert such defense and prove it.67
60. Citing Lattin v. Gillette, 95 Cal. 317, 30 Pac. 545 (1892) and Close v.

Coates, 187 Okla. 315, 102 P.2d 613 (1940).

61. An examination of the state statutes reveals that the average period is
three to five years with a few jurisdictions providing for periods as long as
ten years.
62. See case cited supra note 57.
63. 22 Idaho 440, 126 Pac. 612 (1912).
64. Id. at 448.
65. 135 N.Y.S.2d 748 (1954)

Appeal dismissed, 284 App. Div. 862, 135

N.Y.S.2d 777 (4th Dep't 1954). See also Manville v. Le Flore-McCasland
Abstract & Realty Co., 65 Okla. 12, 162 Pac. 682 (1917) wherein the court referred to payment by plaintiff of an omitted, invalid mortgage as a voluntary
act made at their peril with full knowledge of the law.
66. Id. at page 762. See also Maggio v. Abstract Title & Mortgage Corp.,
98 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1950) wherein the court said that a
plaintiff must show he relied on the title search "otherwise he assumes risk of
any loss he may sustain," and American Trust Invest. Co. v. Nashville Abstract
Co., 39 S.W. 877 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1896).
67. Guaranty Abstract Co. v. Denman, 209 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948).
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CONCLUSION

What is the explanation of the dearth of cases on abstracter liability?
One could be generous and say that the professional abstracter just
does not make mistakes or that he readily settles claims, but either
reason would be difficult to support with facts. A more adequate explanation of the small number of cases would involve the limitations
on actions against abstracters imposed by the common law rules
discussed in this article. This explanation is supported by the fact that
the only substantial activity, if indeed it is substantial, involving abstracter liability has occurred in jurisdictions where legislatures have
by statute expanded the scope of this group's liability to those who
sustain a loss in reliance on their work. One can only conclude that,
in the absence of such statutes, it is somewhat futile for anyone other
than the person who orders the abstract prepared to attempt to hold
an abstracter liable. Even those who are "in privity of contract" with
the abstracter find that the statute of limitations, which starts running
upon the delivery of the abstract; the shortness of the statutory period;
the necessity for establishing reliance on the abstract as prepared;
and the recognition of the abstracter's power to limit the scope of his
undertaking via the certification process have a cumulative effect
which negatives any real chance of a recovery.
Even though he operates under circumstances giving him a large
measure of immunity from lawsuits, it is still necessary to have available abstracts of the record in order to facilitate real estate transactions. Looking at the problem as a purchaser of real estate or a
lending institution it would appear imperative that they avail themselves of covenants of warranty, title insurance and/or title registration where this is available. Perhaps much of the increased use of
title insurance throughout the country can be credited not just to defects in the recording system but also to the rather limited liability of
abstracters and of attorneys preparing title opinions based on such
abstracts. Unfortunately, title insurance can also prove to be a snare
and a delusion for many policies written today exclude from coverage
the very risks that a vendee desires insured.
There does not seem to be any valid reason why the statutes in
vogue in the western states should not be adopted throughout the
country. These statutes certainly stimulate a careful search of the
record and they insure the financial stability of the profession. At best
however, these measures offer only a partial solution in view of the
short statute of limitations and the fact that the statute runs from the
delivery of the abstract. Still, if the abstracting profession wishes to
halt the penetration of their domain by the title insurance companies
(many of whom conduct their own search of the records) it would
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appear that they would be well advised to participate in sponsoring
such legislation and in apprising the public that title insurance is not
a panacea for the evils in the law of conveyancing.
It is astonishing that so little has been written on the general subject of abstracter liability.68 It is hoped that this paper will at least
focus the attention of attorneys with substantial real estate practices
on what seems to be a soft spot in the attorney-abstracter system. The
system is worth saving and the profession should not let it go by
default.
68. Hall, Abstracter's Liability in Examination of Title, 6 Wyo. L.J. 184

(1952); Hoehl, Liability of Abstracters to Third Parties for Omissions in the
Abstract, 1 FLA. L. REV. 70 (1948); Phillips, Liability of Abstracters, 62 Am.
L. REV. 868 (1928); Trusler, Extension of Liability of Abstracters, 18 MiCH. L.

REV. 127 (1919); Comment, 7 ALA. L. REV. 87 (1954); Liability of Abstracting
Attorneys; Note, 4 ALA. L.J. 40 (1928).

